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ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Since 1991 , the cost and schedule of the F-14 Tomcat Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) Program has doubled.
Additionally, the requirements for In-Service Repair (ISR) have grown at a exponential rate as SDLM deferrals from the Aircraft
Service Period Adjustment (ASPA) Program have caused the material condition of the aircraft to deteriorate and the need for depot-
level field team rework to become increasingly demanded. As the cost of SDLM and ISR have grown, the number of aircraft
overhauled each year has decreased. Recent efforts to decrease the scope of the SDLM Specification, or work breakdown, have not
reduced this trend. The 1996 Preliminary SDLM Specification further reduces the depot's requirements placing more work into the
hands of organizational level sailors, without compensating these units with additional manpower.
This cycle will continue and the cost for SDLM and the need for ISR will grow to the point where the aircraft will no longer be
cost effective. In the meantime, our organizational units will continue to strive to maintain the aircraft to an acceptable level while
additional workload is placed on them taking advantage of free sailor labor. This research shows that the present course will lead
the aircraft to a cost effectiveness termination far short of the 2010 goal, while placing an undo burden on our organizational units.
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Since 1991, the cost and schedule of the F-14 Tomcat Standard Depot Level
Maintenance (SDLM) Program has doubled. Additionally, the requirements for In-Service
Repair (ISR) have grown at a exponential rate as SDLM deferrals from the Aircraft Service
Period Adjustment (ASPA) Program have caused the material condition of the aircraft to
deteriorate and the need for depot-level field team rework to become increasingly demanded
As the cost ofSDLM and ISR have grown, the number of aircraft overhauled each year has
decreased. Recent efforts to decrease the scope of the SDLM Specification, or work
breakdown, have not reduced this trend. The 1996 Preliminary SDLM Specification further
reduces the depot's requirements placing more work into the hands of organizational level
sailors, without compensating these units with additional manpower.
This cycle will continue and the cost for SDLM and the need for ISR will grow to
the point where the aircraft will no longer be cost effective. In the meantime, our
organizational units will continue to strive to maintain the aircraft to an acceptable level
while additional workload is placed on them taking advantage of "free" sailor labor. This
research shows that the present course will lead the aircraft to a "cost effectiveness"
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In order to fully comprehend the scope of this thesis, I will first describe how the F-14
overhaul program has developed into its present state. Next, I will describe recent changes
to the specification that have taken place and the impacts of the Aircraft Service Period
Adjustment (ASPA) Program over time.
The Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) Program is defined as "Depot Level
aircraft maintenance accomplished upon attainment of a specified number of calendar months
and/or flight hours of service as designated by OPNAVTNST 3 1 10. 1 1 ." The F-14 Tomcat
was introduced to the fleet in the early 70's. It was initially designed to have an Operating
Service Period (OSP) of 36 months based on engineering design parameters set forth by the
original equipment manufacturer, Grumman Aerospace. The OSP is determined based on
systematic analysis of airframe, systems and component design, operational performance, and
Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) data. The OSP for the F-14 was updated based on
operational experience to 48 months, and then finally to the current 56 month figure in 1981
.
(SDLM Spec, 1992)
The Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA) Program was developed by Naval
Aviation Logistics Center (NAVAVNLOGCEN) and put into place by 1983. This program
involves an in-depth inspection conducted by depot level industrial engineers to determine if
a SDLM is warranted. The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a means of determining
the need, based on material condition, flight time, Period End Date (PED) and other factors,
to induct an aircraft for depot level maintenance. The objective was to save money by
deferring Depot Level maintenance until the material condition of the aircraft warranted its
induction to SDLM, thereby adjusting the basis from "on-time" until "on-condition ." By
applying the ASPA process, depot induction deferrals today have become routine. For
example, there are three F-14A aircraft in NAS Oceana approaching ASPA 6. This equates
to a 128 month OSP or over 10 years between overhaul.
In 1991, the Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) Program for the F-14
Tomcat cost an average of $1.87 Million dollars per aircraft. This process involved 154
structural inspections and 104 system performance checks. By 1993, the cost of SDLM had
grown to an average cost of $2.65 Million dollars per aircraft. In 1994, the SDLM
Specification, or "work package" was significantly reduced, requiring just 83 structural
inspections and 39 system performance checks, only 47% of the work requirements
previously done. Despite the reduction, the average cost of SDLM continued to grow to
$3.24 million dollars by the end of 1994. The Preliminary 1996 SDLM Specification requires
further reductions to 73 structural inspections and 29 system performance checks. The
process will now cover less than 40% of the original overhaul requirements yet costs 60%
more per aircraft, on average.
In-Service Rework (ISR) is a term used to describe depot-level maintenance
performed by engineers representing the naval aviation depot. These personnel perform
various functions including inspection, on-aircraft repair and any required depot-level
modification. These modifications include system upgrades and system capability
improvements.
As the costs associated with SDLM have grown over the years, fewer and fewer
aircraft have been inducted for overhaul. Since the budget associated with In-Service Repair
competes for the same OM&N funds as SDLM, conflicts arise as to what use of the budget
will be optimal. As the material condition of the Tomcat deteriorates and Depot-level
modification requirements increase, an increasing need for ISR to be performed by Depot
Field Teams has arisen. The result of these modifications has caused the budget for ISR to
grow and previously budgeted SDLM "slots" disappear to free available funds for ISR
The continued ASPA deferrals cause additional problems such as the changes in
squadron workload resulting from preparing for and recovering from ASPA Inspections and
the requirements of aging aircraft. Additionally, the recent reductions to the SDLM
Specification have further exacerbated the situation by shifting work, once performed by
depot artisans, down to the organizational level sailors. This represents not only an additional
burden on the sailors, but the potential exists for even greater deterioration of the material
condition of this aircraft due to the lack of technical expertise on vital systems.
This study will show that the present course of action will continue to cause increased
growth to SDLM and ISR costs, while overhauling fewer aircraft each year. Additionally,
the reduced SDLM Specification will cause even greater deterioration to the material
condition of the aircraft as the skilled, Depot artisans will no longer be inspecting critical
aircraft systems. Further, this study will provide justification that the Navy eliminate ASPA
from this vital platform, and drive the aircraft to a set Operating Service Period (OSP), in
order to gain control of the cost and performance of the F- 14 SDLM Program.
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effectiveness of the present F-14 SDLM
Program. It will examine the cost and schedule growth that has occurred despite having the
SDLM "Specification", or work breakdown, reduced. It will examine the results of the
SDLM Specification changes and their impact on the organizational unit maintenance
requirements. Additionally, this thesis will show the impact of the present system in terms of
increasing In-Service Rework requirements due to the ASPA Program, decreased SDLM
specification, and deteriorated material condition of the aircraft.
C. SCOPE OF RESEARCH
This thesis will be divided into three major parts. First, an analysis of what workload
has been shifted from the depot level down to the organizational level and its affect on our
sailors and the material condition of the F-14 will be presented.
Second, the growth associated with In-Service Engineering/Repair for the F-14 will
be analyzed and determine what cost growths are directly attributable to the work removed
from the SDLM Specification.
Third, a historical cost analysis of the F-14 SDLM program, describing cost growth
and ASPA deferral trends will be presented.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II will analyze the modification to the SDLM Specification. This chapter will
review the F-14 SDLM Specifications for 1992, 1994, and the preliminary specification for
1996. This chapter will additionally discuss the SDLM procedures used on the P-3 Orion and
the E-6A TACAMO programs.
Chapter III will analyze the impact of the present policy with regards to the growth
of In-Service Rework, additional workload burden on organizational units, and the
deteriorated material condition of the aircraft.
Chapter IV will analyze the cost and schedule of the F-14 program from 1991 to the
present. A discussion of the trends in budget costs, depot completions and ASPA deferral
rates will be provided.
Chapter V contains the conclusions and recommendations for further study

n. STANDARD DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE (SDLM)
A. BACKGROUND
Naval Aviation Depots provide three general industrial functions. First, they are
involved with the rework of aviation end items, systems and components. Second, they are
involved in the manufacture of items and component parts otherwise not available or that are
cost prohibitive. Third, they are involved with support services which include professional
engineering, technology, and calibration services. The depot is responsible to support the
organizational and intermediate level activities by providing technical assistance and carrying
out those functions that are beyond the responsibility or capability of the O or I level activities
through the use of more extensive facilities, skills and materials. Depot level services are
carried out in depots, or in the field, by personnel representing the depot. It is in this light
that the term 'depot' represents both a capability and a facility. (OPNAVINST 4790.2 series)
Rework of aircraft falls into three categories: maintenance, modification and special
structural inspection. Maintenance functions are those required to maintain or restore the
inherent designed service levels ofperformance, reliability, and material condition. It involves
the complete rebuild through reclamation, refurbishment, overhaul, repair, adjustment,
servicing, and replacement of system consumables. It also includes inspection, calibration,
and testing. Modification functions are those required to change or improve design levels of
performance, reliability, and material condition. Special structural inspections are performed
by the depot to determine fatigue life computations, technical directive compliance
requirements and any inspections that can not be performed by the 'O' or T levels due to a
lack of skills, expertise or equipment. (OPNAVTNST 4790.2 series)
The first F-14 requiring Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) was inducted
into the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Norfolk in 1975. In 1982, the SDLM effort
became dual sited with NADEP North Island coming on line to perform the aircraft overhaul
In 1991, F-14 depot maintenance was single sited back to Norfolk. NADEP North Island
completed its last SDLM overhaul on 26 April 1992. In 1993, the Base Realignment and
Closure Committee (BRAC) decided to close NADEP Norfolk. The F-14 SDLM is currently
being transitioned to NADEP Jacksonville, having inducted their first Tomcat on October 1
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1994. Today, the last few remaining F-14's are finishing their overhaul in Norfolk
Meanwhile, NADEP Jacksonville completed the prototype F-14 SDLM on 16 Jan 1996
(Nixon, 1996)
The multiple changes to the Depot location have no doubt assisted in the increasing
variability that plagues the Tomcat SDLM process. The effect of a "learning curve" has been
prevented from becoming fully optimized due to the various changes to the flow, work
content and demand. The effects of these changes will be further addressed in the cost
analysis portion of this thesis.
B. THE SDLM SPECIFICATION
The SDLM Specification is a document that establishes the overhaul requirements for
naval aircraft These requirements are determined based on systematic analysis of airframe,
systems and component design, operational performance, and Reliability and Maintainability
data. The SDLM process is expected to identify material deficiencies and to correct such
deficiencies so that the aircraft can be maintained at the organizational or intermediate level
with assurance of a high level of operational availability throughout the next Operating
Service Period . (SDLM Spec. 1992)
In 1994, the SDLM Specification "coverage" verbiage was amended to read
"correction of deficiencies shall be at the lowest authorized maintenance level in accordance
with OPNAVTNST 4790.2 series VOL I, Chapter 3. Correction of Depot Level deficiencies
shall be corrected by the most economical means available." This amendment to the scope
of the SDLM Specification was the first step in a significant cost savings drive to regain
control over the Tomcat SDLM process by shifting various overhaul requirements down to
the "sailor" level.
C. SDLM SPECIFICATION REDUCTION
The 1992 SDLM Specification included 154 structural inspections and 104 system
performance checks. The 1994 SDLM Specification reduced the number of structural
inspections to 83 and the system performance checks down to just 39, only 47% of the work
requirements previously performed. The responsibility for the upkeep of those areas no
longer covered under the modified SDLM Specification was shifted down to the
organizational level. It is clear at this point why the "SDLM coverage" section was amended
to read the statement regarding the "lowest authorized maintenance level". What is not clear,
is whether or not we are to infer that the "most economical means" represents "free"
organizational level sailor effort.
The proposed 1996 SDLM Specification calls for further reductions to 73 structural
inspections and 29 system performance checks, only 40% of the work requirements
performed in the 1992 specification.
D. CONSEQUENCES OF A REDUCED SDLM SPECIFICATION
There are two distinct "schools ofthought" on the consequences of a reduced SDLM
Specification that are in diametric opposition to one another - those that endorse a reduction,
and those that oppose it.
For those that endorse a reduction, there is the belief that in the past, NADEP's
performed extensive organizational level repairs and preventative maintenance beyond the
SDLM Specification. This not only drove up costs and Turn Around Time to unacceptable
levels, but created a climate in which squadrons routinely deferred maintenance until SDLM,
which further exaggerated the problems and additionally lead to reduced experience levels in
some areas. Given the reduction to DOD budgets and an era of downsizing, current funding
levels will no longer support this level of effort, and the discrepancies that require less than
Depot level capability must be passed on to those units capable of performing the effort
(Nixon, 1996)
In opposition to this reduction "school of thought" are the organizational level units
and the functional wings. For these units, the shift in requirements adds an additional burden
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to already undermanned and overworked squadrons. The reduced SDLM Specification
places the responsibility for the upkeep of vital components into the hands of the sailors. For
these units, it makes no difference what level of maintenance was initially determined to have
the capability of repair, it is that the work has never been performed by these units which
leads them to question the change. The necessary skills have not been taught, used or




Wing Area and Flap/Slat System
- 13 Structural Inspections cut out of 25
- 1 2 System Requirement Checks cut out of 1
7
2. Environmental Control System (ECS)
- 18 System Requirement Checks cut out of 29
3. Fuel System
- 16 System Requirement Checks cut out of 20
4. Landing Gear System
- No longer inspected. 12 System Requirement Checks cut
These systems are consistently on the list of top ten readiness degraders as published
by Fighter Wing Atlantic in NAS Oceana, VA. (Stephens, 1996)
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e) impact of aspa on the sdlm process
The impact that ASPA is having on organizational level maintenance is also
significant, though it is extremely difficult to accurately quantify the magnitude of this burden
As discussed, the Navy has changed the procedures for depot level maintenance due to ASPA
and a reduced SDLM Specification, but no changes were made at the organizational or
intermediate levels. Maintenance data does not reveal or code time expended by the squadron
to prepare for and recover from ASPA evolutions. Squadron maintenance personnel schedule
ASPA evolutions concurrent with other scheduled maintenance to reduce aircraft down time
to a minimum Discrepancies noted and corrected during the preparation for an ASPA
inspection are lumped in with the other scheduled maintenance being performed Countless
man-hours are expended "cleaning the aircraft up"of minor material condition discrepancies
to avoid a "hit" on an ASPA inspection. The results of the ASPA inspection are forwarded
to the functional wing for their review, which provides a quick analysis of the quality of the
maintenance being performed by the squadron. It is, therefore, in the best interest of the
squadron to "groom an aircraft" by correcting material condition discrepancies prior to its
review by the ASPA inspectors. Again, the man-hours involved in this evolution are not
normally coded which would enable us to see a clearer picture of the actual workload being
performed. In any case, there are hundreds of man-hours spent each year in squadrons
because of ASPA evolutions that could be spent in other capacities.
As the F-14 continues to age with only a handful of aircraft being overhauled yearly,
the number of ASPA inspections performed each year increases. The functional wings
12
attempt to spread the quality of aircraft out throughout the respective squadrons, but there
is little that can be done to slow the aging process. As the age continues to rise, the material
condition of the aircraft deteriorates. Squadrons are now forced to perform depot level
maintenance with only organizational level expertise. As the ASPA deferrals increase, and
the material condition of aircraft inducted into SDLM deteriorates, this creates additional
SDLM workload and places a burden on the depot. The depot now has to correct the work
performed by organizational level technicians who do not posses the depot skill or expertise
to perform the work.
The ASPA program, as a whole, has had a significant impact on both the
organizational and depot level maintenance in terms of materials, scheduling, turn around time
(TAT) and parts support by increasing the variability of the process. The ASPA program
makes the planning and scheduling process extremely difficult at both the depot and
organizational levels. There is a high degree of variability or uncertainty regarding the labor
required, materials and the number of aircraft inducted into SDLM each year. With the
ASPA process, there can be no established schedule for inductions each year. Therefore, no
accurate planning or forecasting can be made regarding the number of SDLM's the depot can
expect. (Legidakes/Ramsey, 1 994)
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F. ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL SDLM LABOR REQUIREMENTS
The following chart shows the average amount of labor hours spent performing an







1991 288,492 12 24,041
1992 270,305 10 27,031
1993 410,048 14 29,289
1994 440,442 13 33,880
1995 Not Available 12 Not Available
Figure 1. F-14 SDLM Labor Requirements
per aircraft have continuously grown over the period covered, despite a significant reduction
to the SDLM Specification in 1994. Unfortunately, no information was available for aircraft
inducted into SDLM from 1995 until the present. Many of these aircraft have completed
SDLM and have been delivered to their respective squadrons, but have not been financially
completed, therefore the data is unavailable.
By contrast, Figure 2 (below) provides labor requirements on the Air Force F- 1
5







1991 279,208 34 8,212
1993 543,620 44 12,355
Figure 2. Air Force F-15 Eagle SDLM Labor Requirements
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overhaul every 72 months. (Legidakes/Ramsey, 1994) Granted, the F-15 operates in a much
more benign environment, but the physical attributes and age of the aircraft are very similar.
The dramatic differences between the labor requirements and the number of aircraft overhauls
performed each year clearly indicates the need for a change to our current overhaul policy.
G. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SDLM
The Navy recently began exploring alternative methods to the SDLM process. The
P-3 Orion and the E-6A TACAMO programs are attempting to eliminate the ASPA process
from their respective programs and are working with a strict Operating Service Period.
1. P-3 Orion
The Navy P-3 program began its initial analysis in 1989 for the Phase Depot
Maintenance Program. In a 'phase depot maintenance system', aircraft are inducted into the
depot for rework based solely on the number of calender months that have elapsed. The P-3
program was experiencing deteriorated material condition, rapid growth to ISR work,
deteriorating ASPA results, and rapidly escalating organizational level man-hours. The P-3
is now inducted into the depot every four years, rather than one time in ten years as it was
experiencing with the ASPA process. To change from one process to another, the program
needed a transition period, which it received in the way of the Sustained Readiness Program
(SRP). This program allowed the previous SDLM process to occur, while the phase concept
was introduced to prototype aircraft. In the phase concept, the SDLM Specification had to
be significantly overhauled to accommodate the new phase concept. Certain aspects of the
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specification such as painting the aircraft needed to be performed every phase. Other aspects
of the specification were modified such that various systems and components were allowed
to go the entire twelve year period without being reworked. Again, these decisions were
based on thorough review of Reliability Centered Maintenance concepts and analysis This
program is under continuous process improvement as the specification is being constantly
reviewed to accomplish the goals of the entire P-3 Orion team. (Campbell, 1996)
The Commanding Officer ofNADEP, Jacksonville has recently begun an initiative to
help reduce the number of "noted, but not corrected" discrepancies on P-3's completing
SDLM. "Noted, but not corrected" or NBNC discrepancies are items which are determined
to be beneath the capability of the depot-level unit and therefore fall out of the category of
"most economical means". The NADEP in Jacksonville is co-located with several P-3
organizational units. Taking advantage of this, the CO. ofNADEP Jacksonville has created
a program that will allow organizational level maintenance personnel to visit the depot and
correct the NBNC discrepancies as they occur. This system allows a full system, high quality
aircraft to be returned to its parent command in a timely manner, without a "shopping list"
ofNBNC discrepancies for them to repair
2. E-6A TACAMO
The Navy E-6A TACAMO program has implemented an overhaul program for its
aircraft called the Enhanced Phase Maintenance (EPM) Program. The EPM program
incorporates depot-level tasks into squadron scheduled inspections thereby eliminating
traditional overhauls based on fixed time periods.
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The implementation of the EPM program began in September 1993, with the first of
three prototype aircraft. A one-year "test" period started in March 1994 which measured
aircraft availability, mission capability and system performance rates, and monitored the
material condition of the three aircraft. EPM was developed to limit down time on aircraft
due to depot maintenance in order to avoid excessive "out of service time" causing a severe
degradation to operations. This degradation was caused by depot inductions and a
simultaneous extensive aircraft modification program. The effort not only improved aircraft
availability, but also significantly improved the material condition of the aircraft and reduced
organizational level maintenance man-hours. In some cases, total maintenance man-hours
have been reduced by forty percent. Most of the maintenance man-hours are now expended
during periods planned and set aside for maintenance. As a result, the maintenance effort is
more predictable and the "well groomed" E-6A aircraft operates better and longer between
failures.
The EPM program, as implemented in the TACAMO community, provides a very
proactive maintenance methodology. It is primarily a reliability centered maintenance (RCM)
based inspection program. Depot tasks are scheduled and performed based on RCM analysis
and aircraft utilization. The most obvious benefit is the valuable insight into the aircraft's




As was the case in the P-3 example, the E-6A depot-level support is co-located at
Tinker, AFB in Oklahoma City, OK. This provides ease in communication and rapid
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response. This situation no longer exists in the case of the F-14 Tomcat due to BRAC '93.
The aircraft will be single sited to NAS Oceana in Virginia Beach, Virginia, while the
supporting depot is in Jacksonville, Florida. The traditional depot "paradigm" involves a
process where the depot is a facility, containing only depot level manpower, tools and
equipment. However, the P-3 and E-6A programs provide clear examples that the traditional
SDLM paradigm must be examined for each platform. The overhaul program must be
tailored to the unique requirements of the aircraft to include the restructuring of all three
levels of maintenance to most effectively accomplish the mission.
H. PREVIEW
Chapter III will analyze the impact of the present policy with regards to the growth
of In-Service Repair, additional workload burden on organizational level units, and the




In-Service Repair (ISR) is a term used to describe depot-level maintenance work
performed by engineers representing the naval aviation depot. These personnel perform
various functions including inspection such as ASPA, on-aircraft repair and any required
depot-level modification. These modifications include system upgrades and system capability
improvements. This chapter will discuss the increases in the usage of this function and its
affect on the organizational unit and the F-14 SDLM process.
B. THE USE OF IN-SERVICE REPAIR
Until 1994, the usage of In-Service Repair money was not tracked. Funds for this
type of depot-level maintenance were set aside in a general industrial fund that also contained
the SDLM budgets for all naval aircraft. The recent downsizing measures helped illuminate
the problem associated with the tracking and usage of this "pot of money". Until 1 994, these
funds were issued out to each type command on an as needed basis. Should a shortfall occur
toward the end of a fiscal year, funds were re-allocated from within the general depot
program to include the use ofSDLM dollars. On a recurring basis, aircraft SDLM overhauls
have been cut in order to 'free up' available funds for ISR efforts. (Tuttle, 1996)
In-Service Repair funds are used to cover the expenses involved with the ASPA
inspection process. Each ASPA inspection is composed of four to five depot-level engineers
19
who provide a general material condition evaluation of fleet aircraft to determine whether or
not an aircraft should be considered for SDLM. As the number of aircraft in the ASPA
deferral 'window' increases due to fewer and fewer SDLM's, the cost associated with



























Figure 3. F-14 ISR Expenditures
The data from Figure 2 was obtained from the Naval Aviation Depot Operations
Center (NADOC) Aircraft Division. In 1994, the first year ISR was monitored by aircraft
type/model/series (T/M/S), $11,454,836.55 was spent on the F-14 ISR effort. Of this,
$350,403.80 was spent on ASPA. In 1995, $18,722,855.86 was spent on ISR, with ASPA
accounting for $4,688, 1 83.24. Again, the manpower and material requirements used by the
organizational level in preparing for and recovering from these ASPA evolutions is not
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accurately revealed. The "ASPA"costs in Figure 3 are based solely on depot-level labor used
in performing ASPA inspections and the costs of any required depot-level repair which was
discovered during the inspection.
Why the costs associated with the ASPA process grew so significantly in 1995 cannot
be accurately explained. The data for 1994 may not accurately include all of the true ASPA
costs. To date, there is still no easy way of identifying ISR expenditures by specific aircraft
bureau number. To determine what aircraft received ISR funding, you must look at ISR
depot job orders and then search for which bureau numbers were affected. This process is
extremely time consuming and can easily mask important data from being revealed. In order
to see the true cost of an ASPA deferral, there needs to be a means of accurately assigning
all costs to an individual aircraft that is in the ASPA deferral "window." Only then, will we
be able to see the "true" costs associated with the ASPA process.
In-Service Repair funds also cover the costs of providing depot-level field teams who
perform on-aircraft repair and modification. When an aircraft appears to have a discrepancy
that is above the level of maintenance capability of the organizational level unit, a Planner and
Estimator (P&E) Request is submitted via the functional wing to the NADEP. The NADEP
then dispatches an engineer to the site of the aircraft to assess the need. Should depot level
assistance be required, the NADEP then schedules a field team visit to the aircraft site to
perform the required maintenance. There is a perception that too much "O" and "I" level
work is being performed during these evolutions and precious ISR funds are being
squandered. This simply is unfounded. All P&E requests must be approved by the functional
21
wing prior to being submitted to the NADEP. The functional wings determine what is within
and what is above the maintenance capability ofthese units and organize the field team usage
As the aircraft ages, and more SDLM's are deferred, the need for ISR work has
increased. Additionally, there are various required depot-level inspections that must occur
based on specific calendar related criteria. The 68 month Wing Sweep Pivot Bearing
Inspection is one such inspection. This event requires extensive tear down of the aircraft that
includes the removal of the wings. This inspection used to be performed in conjunction with
SDLM, but the use ofASPA deferrals has caused this to change. The inspection is now being
performed in the field at NAS Oceana. Events such as this require tremendous organizational
level assistance in accomplishing the disassembly, reassembly, and quality assurance
inspection of the respective systems. The sailor effort again is not accounted for, and the
amount of man-hours are increasing significantly. For every ISR evolution, there will be a
significant contribution by the organizational level in preparing for and recovering from the
event. Just as in the case of the SDLM Specification reduction, these units are not being
compensated with additional manpower.
As the trend continues, more and more burden is being placed on the organizational
units. When questioned, the standard response is that the required work ultimately falls
within the proper level of maintenance as per the appropriate regulation. What is not being
addressed is the additional workload that has been increasing at an alarming rate with
absolutely no forethought or evaluation.
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C. PREVIEW
Chapter IV will analyze the cost and schedule of the F-14 program from 1991 to the
present. A discussion of the trends in budget costs, depot completions and ASPA deferral
rates will be provided.
23
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IV. SDLM COST ANALYSIS
A. BACKGROUND
This chapter will provide cost data on the F-14 SDLM program from 1991 through
1995. During this period, the SDLM process was single sited at NADEP Norfolk. Therefore,
this data should provide consistent trend information. The data for 1991 through 1993 was
obtained from previous Naval Postgraduate School thesis research performed by LCDR Bob
Ramsey, USN and LT Leo Legidakes, USN in December 1994. The data from 1994 until the
present was obtained by the Naval Aviation Depot Operations Center (NADOC) Aircraft
Division. As of the completion of this project, no aircraft inducted into SDLM for Fiscal
Years 95' until the present had been financially completed and therefore were not available
for review. All values presented are in 'then-year' dollars or man-hours. This section will
discuss trends in budget costs, depot completions and ASPA deferral rates.
B. SDLM COST
Chapter II described the problems associated with the F-14 overhaul process with
respect to the reduction to the SDLM Specification and the impact ASPA has had on the
SDLM process. Chapter III described the increasing use of In-Service repair and its affect
on the organizational level units. The problems associated with the F-14 SDLM Program can
also be seen by examining the rising SDLM costs. The complete spreadsheet detailing
estimated versus actual cost by bureau number can be reviewed in the Appendix. To facilitate
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this thesis presentation, I have compiled excerpts from this information to show the trends






















1991 17,829 24,041 $386,248 $421,405 $1,455,749 $1,872,574
1992 18,124 29,784 $401,468 $538,510 $1,547,937 $2,420,912
1993 18,338 29,289 $425,642 $564,500 $1,746,205 $2,672,225
1994 19,743 34,064 $425,767 $1,017,545 $1,590,266 $3,241,316
1995 20,585 N/A*** $591,712 N/A*** $2,301,683 N/A***
1996 28,807 N/A*** $792,531 N/A*** $2,150,080 N/A* * *
N/A***- denotes data not available
Figure 4. F-14 SDLM Cost Data
Figure 4 provides estimated versus actual figures for material cost, labor requirements
and total cost for the F-14 Tomcat from 1991 to 1996. This data shows increasing trends
in all of the above listed categories. Additionally the variance between what
is estimated and what is actually occurring is worsening over time in all categories. This
problem leads to annual 'cuts' to the numbers of aircraft inducted into SDLM which, in turn,
leads to the exponential effect of increasing ASPA deferrals, aircraft age, ISR requirements,
O-level workload and material condition deterioration. This variation can be seen graphically
in Figures 5 through 7 (following pages). This information clearly indicates a program that
is out of control and deteriorating at an increasing rate.
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Figure 5. Estimated vs. Actual Man-hours
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Figure 6. Estimated vs Actual Material Costs
28












1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49
AIRCRAFT
Figure 7. Estimated vs. Actual Total Cost
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C. COST IMPACT
Over the next several years, the Tomcat community will reduce the number of F- 14's
to a core force of 250 aircraft, down from the present inventory of roughly 280. The term
"core" is used to refer to those aircraft which are configured with certain systems that will
provide the greatest future use to the naval aviation community. (Stephens, 1996)
As the cost associated with SDLM rises each year, fewer SDLM's will be able to be
performed, and the number of ASPA deferrals will increase. As the average age of fleet
aircraft grows, the amount of preventative and corrective maintenance needed to keep the
aircraft at acceptable availability and capability rates will also grow. This trend, combined
with a reduced SDLM Specification and increasing ISR requirements can mean only one
thing - more work for the organizational level sailor. "Do more with less" was once a
meaningless colloquialism used to describe how DOD activities needed to rid the waste and
excesses of their respective organizations. Today, the phrase is more of an "albatross"





This thesis has described the present condition of the F-14 SDLM process. The
analysis has centered on a decreased SDLM Specification, increasing ISR needs, and rising
SDLM costs. The following can be concluded:
1. Increasing burden on our sailors
The 1994 SDLM Specification removed 53% of the depot level requirements. The
Preliminary 1996 Specification attempts to eliminate an additional 7%, totaling a 60%
decrease to the requirements ofthe original overhaul specification. The responsibility for the
completion of these requirements has been shifted down to the organizational level units.
2. Increasing In-Service Repair Costs and Requirements
The requirements for In-Service Repair have increased at an exponential rate as the
number ofSDLM deferrals due to the ASPA program and the average age of the aircraft have
increased. In 1995, the ISR budget for the F-14 alone was nearly $19 Million dollars,
accounting for almost one third of the budget for ISR for all of naval aviation. As a result
ofthe ISR cost growth, funded F-14 SDLM "slots" have been canceled further exaggerating
the problems. The extensive use of depot field teams has created a very expensive "fourth"
level of maintenance.
31
3. Increasing SDLM labor requirements
Despite the SDLM specification reduction in 1994, the number of man-hours required
to complete an overhaul has increased by an average of over 9,000 hours per aircraft between
1991 and 1995.
4. Increasing SDLM costs
The total cost to complete an F-14 overhaul has increased by an average of over $1.3
million dollars per aircraft between 1991 and 1995.
The present policy will allow this cycle to continue while placing additional
responsibilities and workload on the backs of our organizational level sailors. As the cost of
each overhaul increases, fewer and fewer aircraft will be inducted into SDLM. The number
of ASPA deferrals will continue to increase, as will the costs associated with In-Service
Repair.
The F-14 'A' model aircraft are "programmed" to be in existence only until 2004, with
the B's and D's lasting until 2010. The expectation is that the F-14 carrier deployment
requirement will be reduced as F/A-18 E and F models will be available to deploy by 2004.
Banking the future of the F-14 on the expectations of a replacement does not seem prudent.
More likely than not, the F-14A's will still be making deployments long past 2004, and the
need for B's and D's will be carried out into the future as well. The need for a change to the
present SDLM policy is here. Before long, the average time between overhaul for the
Tomcat may become too long, and the only course of action will be similar to our present
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policy ofexpensive patchwork maintenance. Today, there is still time to change the way we
do business.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are my recommendations to regain control over the F-14 SDLM Program:
1. Standardize Maintenance Procedures
The variability between aircraft can be addressed through strict adherence to
standardization. Beginning this summer, all F-14's will be single sited to NAS Oceana, VA.
This move will provide the opportunity to standardize the quality of maintenance being
performed throughout the Tomcat community. This will also allow the functional wing at
NAS Oceana to ensure a standard product is being input into the SDLM process.
2. Optimize the usage of SDLM and ISR Dollars
The cost and schedule growth of the F-14 SDLM program can be reduced by more
efficiently and effectively allocating resources. Performing major depot-level work using ISR
funds while the aircraft is in the ASPA deferral window is not cost effective. Recently,
aircraft are even having frame 569 bulkheads replaced, a 2,700 depot-level man-hour effort,
only to send the aircraft back out to the fleet to re-enter the ASPA process.
3. Drive the Aircraft to a Strict OSP
My recommendation would be to drive the aircraft to a strict Operating Service
Period, concurrent to the need for major depot-level maintenance such as the 68 month Wing
Sweep Pivot Bearing Inspection. This would extend the OSP out from the current 56
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months, but it would be far shorter than today's fleet average of 90 to 100 months between
overhaul. The "younger" aircraft will be in superior material condition and will require fewer
"over and aboves" therefore driving down the cost per SDLM. This effort will, in turn, allow
more aircraft to be inducted into the depot each year. The ultimate goal targets an overhaul
to the entire fleet of aircraft every 68 months, instead of every 25 years as with today's pace.
4. Eliminate ASPA Deferrals
Clearly, it is not possible to institute a Phase Depot Maintenance (PDM) program in
one sweep ofthe pen. There will be a critical transition period, as in the case of the P-3 and
E-6A programs. The program change will take time and there will be a significant "learning
effect" involved as trade-offs will have to occur between SDLM inductions and ISR
requirements. By adopting a firm induction schedule, solely based on strict adherence to a
specified operating service period, will provide a significant reduction to the major cost
drivers now plaguing the F-14 SDLM process. This process will help to reduce the
variabilities and uncertainties in turn around time, work schedule, manpower planning, and
material requirements. Additionally, we will be able to alleviate much of the burden that has
been placed on our sailors.
5. Use Innovative Methods to Improve the Process
Using the examples provided in the P-3 and E-6A cases, we need to look at ways to
facilitate the depot process. NADEP Jacksonville could create a detachment of Tomcat
trained organizational level maintenance personnel to correct O-level discrepancies as in the
case of the P-3's. This becomes a manpower issue, but the downsizing of F-14 units should
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be able to provide ample numbers ofTomcat trained maintainers looking for career enhancing
shore duty. The F-14 community needs to break down the traditional SDLM paradigm, and
think of depot as a "capability", instead of a "facility". This will allow creativity and
innovation into the overhaul process allowing the Navy to achieve its operational goals more
efficiently and effectively while preserving the usefulness of this highly capable aircraft.
C. FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis attempted to quantify the costs associated with the F-14 SDLM process.
The true cost of SDLM for each Tomcat must include the costs for the ASPA inspection
process, In-Service Rework, and the increased workload on the backs of our organizational
level sailors. Today, the costs associated with much of these processes are not clearly
discernable. Future studies may examine how to improve these processes to more accurately
reflect the true costs associated with ASPA deferrals. Additional research may examine the
effects of restructuring our naval aviation depots to include organizational as well as






1 Ind. Est. Act. Var. Mat'l Mat'l Var. Labor Est. Act. Variation
NADEP BUNO Year Mhrs. Mhrs. lab(hrs) Cost Cost Mat'l Rate Tot. Cost Tot. Cost Tot. Cost tour aspa
1 Norfolk 159017 1991 20385 22437 -2052 31 8333 258875 59458 50.27 1343087 1386783 -43696 4
2 Norfolk 161147 1991 18124 22413 -4289 439208 325671 113537 55.37 1442734 1566679 -123945 2
3 Norfolk 161164 1991 19707 21263 -1556 457778 421740 36038 58.65 1613594 1668815 -55221 2
4 Norfolk 159454 1991 20311 29074 -8763 503000 604315 -101315 62.66 1775687 2426092 -650405 4
5 Norfolk 161150 1991 19101 20809 -1708 310269 332760 -22491 58.5 1427678 1550087 -122409 2
6 Norfolk 159457 1991 18097 25455 -7358 345553 439952 -94399 60.52 1440783 1980489 -539705 3
7 Norfolk 159606 1991 20311 30545 -10234 439208 639533 -200325 64.1 1741143 2597468 -856324 3
8 Norfolk 161281 1991 14675 23254 -8579 495697 509074 -13377 67.18 1481564 2071278 -589714 2
9 Norfolk 161850 1991 16846 24207 -7361 304581 355653 -51072 59.2 1301864 1788707 -486843 3
10 Norfolk 161853 1991 15114 18546 -3432 374522 399229 -24707 66.31 1376731 1629014 -252283 3
11 Norfolk 161857 1991 15742 23929 -8187 313214 341123 -27909 58.45 1233334 1739773 -506439 2
12 Norfolk 161861 1991 15531 26558 -11027 333617 428933 -95316 61.63 1290793 2065703 -774910 2
13 Norfolk 160389 1992 18124 30197 -12073 439208 511992 -72784 60.49 1535529 2338609 -803080
14 Norfolk 160411 1992 18124 31433 -13309 432000 645358 -213358 65.99 1628003 2719622 -1091619 1
15 Norfolk 161868 1992 18124 27263 -9139 364420 410129 -45709 59.22 1437723 2024644 -586921 2
16 Norfolk 161860 1992 18124 28333 -10209 432000 681834 -249834 69.4 1689806 2648144 -958339 2
17 Norfolk 160386 1992 18124 32385 -14261 364420 497094 -132674 59.7 1446423 2430479 -984056
18 Norfolk 1 60390 1992 18124 29848 -11724 364420 464568 -100148 61.63 1481402 2304100 -822698 1
19 Norfolk 161855 1992 18124 29790 -11666 31 5000 474388 -159388 60.84 1417664 228681
2
-869147 2
>0 Norfolk 161858 1992 18124 28516 -10392 432000 610794 -178794 66.24 1632534 2499694 -867160 2
>1 Norfolk 161859 1992 18124 32540 -14416 439208 561667 -122459 62.82 1577758 2605830 -1028072 2
>2 Norfolk 162604 1992 18124 27535 -9411 432000 527273 -95273 66.24 1632534 2351191 -718658 1
23 Norfolk 161284 1993 18124 30363 -12239 432000 826597 -394597 72.6 1747802 3030951 -1283148 2 2
>4 Norfolk 161603 1993 18374 33269 -14895 424582 614948 -190366 69.04 1693123 291 1 840 -1218717 3
>5 Norfolk 162600 1993 18124 31556 -13432 432000 621925 -189925 64.97 1609516 2672118 -1062602 1
26 Norfolk 162691 1993 18374 27179 -8805 424582 494002 -69420 71.98 1747143 2450346 -703204 2
27 Norfolk 162700 1993 18374 26702 -8328 424582 411899 12683 70.6 1721786 2297060 -575274 2
>8 Norfolk 161607 1993 18374 25837 -7463 424582 602802 -178220 78.07 1859040 2619897 -760856 3
>9 Norfolk 161609 1993 18374 31363 -1 2989 424582 506284 -81702 69.79 1706903 2695108 -988204 3
30 Norfolk 161621 1993 18374 31239 -1 2865 424582 843760 -419178 81.94 1930148 3403484 -1473336 3
31 Norfolk 162599 1993 18374 27664 -9290 424582 434861 -10279 70.44 1718847 2383513 -664667 2
32 Norfolk 162692 1993 18374 27606 -9232 424582 566071 -141489 75.98 1820639 2663575 -842936 3
33 Norfolk 160382 1993 18374 31750 -13376 424582 550492 -125910 71.91 1745856 2833635 -1087778 3 3
34 Norfolk 160407 1993 18374 32803 -14429 424582 590394 -165812 72.01 1747694 2952538 -1204844 3 2
36 Norfolk 162603 1993 18374 24522 -6148 424582 385524 39058 69.06 1693490 2079013 -385523 2
35 Norfolk 162693 1993 18374 28195 -9821 424582 453443 -28861 69.68 1704882 2418071 -713188 3
37 Norfolk 160403 1994 18124 39587 -21463 432000 1 087946 -655946 68.5 1673494 3799656 -2126162 3 1
38 Norfolk 162597 1994 18374 31093 -12719 424582 567114 -142532 69.99 1710578 2743313 -1032735 2
39 Norfolk 162601 1994 18374 30579 -12205 424582 576028 -151446 70.77 1724910 2740104 -1015194 2
10 Norfolk 158637 1994 20894 36586 -15692 423699 1508618 -1084919 56.05 1594808 3698255 -2103447 3 1
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Est. Act
1 Ind. Est. Act. Var. Mat'l Mat'l Var Labor Est Act Variation
NADEP BUNO Year Mhrs. Mhrs. lab(hrs) Cost Cost Mat'l Rate Tot. Cost Tot. Cost Tot Cost tour aspa
11 Norfolk 159444 1994 21878 25723 -3845 423699 897702 -474003 56 05 1649961 3444616 -1794655
12 Norfolk 1 59845 1994 19878 36585 -16707 423699 1159940 -736241 56.05 1537861 3444412 -1906551 3 2
13 Norfolk 160396 1994 19878 36079 -16201 440517 1453587 -1013070 56.05 1554679 3384587 -1829908 3 3
14 Norfolk 1 60669 1994 19878 35279 -15401 423699 1161319 -737620 56.05 1537861 3353558 -1815697 3 3
15 Norfolk 160925 1994 19878 42101 -22223 423699 1091742 -668043 56.05 1537861 3636931 -2099070 2 3
16 Norfolk 161141 1994 19878 33561 -1 3683 423699 692752 -269053 56.05 1537861 2743268 -1205407 3 1
17 Norfolk 161274 1994 19878 36245 -16367 423699 922174 -498475 56.05 1537861 3148655 -1610794 2 1
18 Norfolk 162688 1994 19878 29811 -9933 423699 1041853 -618154 56.05 1537861 3067210 -1529349 1 4
19 Norfolk 162689 1994 19878 29597 -9719 423699 1067307 -643608 56.05 1537861 2932549 -1394688 1 5
30 Norfolk 1 59873 1995 19265 NA**' 49661
2
NA- 78.95 2017584
31 Norfolk 161421 1995 19265 NA*** 496612 NA*" 78.95 2017584
32 Norfolk 161428 1995 19265 NA*** 496612 NA*" 78.95 2017584
33 Norfolk 161432 1995 19265 NA**' 496612 NA"* 78.95 2017584
34 Norfolk 141435 1995 19265 NA*" 496612 NA*** 7895 2017584
35 Norfolk 162916 1995 19265 NA*** 496612 NA*** 78.95 2017584
36 Norfolk 162920 1995 19265 NA- 496612 NA*" 78.95 2017584
37 Jax 161162 1995 35106 NA**' 1665080 NA*** 88.02 47551 1
38 Jax 160910 1995 19265 NA*" 489796 NA*** 88.02 2185501
39 Jax 161272 1995 19265 NA*'* 489796 NA"* 88.02 2185501
50 Jax 161856 1995 19265 NA*** 489796 NA*" 88.02 2185501
31 Jax 162697 1995 19265 NA*** 489796 NA*" 88.02 2185501
52 Jax 162917 1996 1 9265 NA*** 489796 NA- 88.02 2185501
53 Jax 161280 1996 28807 NA*** 792531 NA*" 46.95 2145020
54 Jax 161294 1996 28807 NA*** 792531 NA*** 46.95 2145020
55 Jax 162923 1996 28807 NA*** 792531 NA*** 46.95 2145020
56 Jax 163221 1996 28807 NA**' 792531 NA*** 46.95 2145020
57 Jax 161141 1996 28807 NA*" 792531 NA*** 46.95 2145020
58 Jax 162919 1996 28807 NA*** 792531 NA*" 46.95 2145020
59 Jax 163408 1996 28807 NA*** 792531 NA*" 46.95 21 45020
NAA y ^y _ denot ss in1?orma tion nc t avail,able
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